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ABSTRACT 
 
The literature studying citizen responses to exposed political corruption is rapidly growing. While 
some studies explore how information credibility and group identities can reduce the electoral impact 
of the exposure of corruption, this article addresses different mechanisms for weak electoral 
accountability for corruption: public works provision and corruption prevalence. It uses a vignette 
experiment embedded in a national survey in Peru to isolate the causal effect of political corruption 
on electoral support. The results suggest that even types of corruption with side benefits would be 
harshly punished when attributed to incompetent politicians. They also indicate that while voters 
punish corruption more leniently when a candidate is competent, they respond negatively to 
corruption regardless of the prevalence of corruption, which casts doubt on the idea that voters in 
highly corrupt environments are tolerant of corruption. 
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1. Introduction 
 
A rapidly growing literature on citizen responses to corruption has advanced our understanding about 
how information credibility and group identities can reduce the electoral impact of the exposure of 
corruption (Anduiza, Gallego, & Muñoz, 2013; Botero et. al., 2015; Weitz-Shapiro & Winters, 2017). 
In comparison, we know less about how some contextual conditions undermine informed voters’ 
ability to punish corrupt candidates. While we know that economic gains are one prominent factor 
explaining why voters sometimes overlook corruption (Fernández-Vázquez, Barberá, & Rivero, 2016; 
Manzetti & Wilson, 2007; Rosas & Manzetti, 2015; Zechmeister & Zizumbo-Colunga, 2013), we are 
still unclear about the nuances of the relationship between corruption accusations and candidate 
competence in public works provision, and our existing knowledge about the trading of corruption for 
economic wellbeing has not yet offered guidance about how this exchange plays out in highly corrupt 
environments.  
The exciting empirical literature about the longstanding idea that tolerance of corruption is a 
function of the benefits voters associate with corrupt politicians has produced mixed evidence. While 
some studies have found that economic side benefits could help protect corrupt politicians from 
electoral penalties (Marko Klašnja & Tucker, 2013; Zechmeister & Zizumbo-Colunga, 2013), other 
research finds the opposite, that good performers are punished with larger penalties (Esaiasson & 
Muñoz, 2014; Winters & Weitz-Shapiro, 2013). We therefore need more research to clarify the intricate 
nature of the relationship between corruption and economic welfare. The present paper builds on the 
literature’s disagreement and analyzes the relationship with additional nuance. I focus on the specific 
ways in which economic wellbeing drives voters’ tolerance of corruption. One version of the link that 
is often found in the literature suggests that certain types of corruption bring side benefits that would 
render corruption innocuous to voters. Instead, I argue that economic performance induces voters to 
evaluate corruption of competent politicians in a fundamentally different way from that of incompetent 
ones. This is an important distinction, because if voters are more lenient with corrupt candidates who 
are competent, even types of corruption that carry side benefits will be harshly punished when 
attributed to incompetent politicians.  
This article makes several contributions that advance our understanding of the micro-
foundations of political accountability for corruption. Theoretically, it distinguishes between the above-
mentioned versions of voters’ exchange of corruption for economic wellbeing. Moreover, it identifies 
a type of selective public good, infrastructure projects, which can affect voters’ decisions to support a 
corrupt candidate. Empirically, this paper explicitly evaluates how voters’ expectations of corruption 
may moderate the impact of corruption. Existing cross-national studies showing that voters overlook 
corruption to preserve economic wellbeing in highly corrupt environments but do not do so in low 
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corruption environments have not tested this effect directly. The present paper separates the goods 
provision effect from the “they are all corrupt” effect by manipulating voters’ expectations of 
corruption and leveraging within-country variation of corruption perceptions.  
Lastly, this article draws from data of a survey experiment in Peru, a low-middle income 
country with a long history of corruption and weak rule of law (Quiroz, 2008). Like other young 
democracies, this developing country has enacted reforms aiming at increasing government 
transparency and strengthening political institutions, but these reforms have been implemented 
unevenly (Levitsky, 2013; Vergara & Watanabe, 2016). More importantly, although corruption has 
become one of the most critical problems for Peruvians in recent years, corruption concerns vary 
considerably across the country. Only a handful of regions see corruption as the top political concern, 
while the rest are primarily worried about the more pressing matters of crime and unemployment.  
The paper will proceed as follows. First, I review the existing literature on the interaction 
between corruption, candidate competence, and voters’ expectations of corruption and present the 
arguments and hypotheses. Second, I describe the survey experiment I designed for Peru and compare 
it to other candidate vignettes in corruption experiments. The third section presents the results of the 
experimental study. The final section discusses some of the key implications of the findings and 
concludes.  
 
2. Corruption, Competence, and Voting  
In spite of the prevailing view that elected officials who are charged with wrongdoings are able 
to hold on to office or retain popular support, recent experimental studies find that exposing 
corruption can help prevent the persistence of dishonest officials in government (Ferraz & Finan, 2008; 
Banerjee et al., 2010; Bobonis et al., 2010). This divergence has renewed the interest in understanding 
precisely how and when voters use this evidence to inform their candidate evaluations and decide their 
vote (for good reviews of this literature see de Sousa and Moriconi (2013) and De Vries and Solaz 
(2017)). Some experimental studies show that the effect of exposing corruption depends on the severity 
of the malfeasance (Chong et al., 2015) and on the credibility of the sources of information (Botero et 
al., 2015, 2017; Weitz- Shapiro & Winters, 2017). Other noteworthy studies show that voters are more 
likely to overlook corruption cases that affect their own party, their own ethnic group, or male 
politicians (Anduiza et al., 2013; Banerjee & Pande, 2009; Barnes, Beaulieu, & Saxton, 2017). Another 
strand of the literature focuses on how certain contextual and institutional factors may influence voter 
responses to exposed corruption (Chang & Golden, 2007; Charron & Bågenholm, 2016; Kunicová & 
Rose-Ackerman, 2005; Schwindt-Bayer & Tavits, 2016; Xezonakis, Kosmidis, & Dahlberg, 2016). But 
our understanding of why and how certain political contexts are more conducive to political 
accountability is still incomplete. 
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Among the contextual factors that may influence the decision to punish a corrupt candidate, 
the economy is one of the most prominent (Manzetti & Wilson, 2007; Rosas & Manzetti, 2015; 
Zechmeister & Zizumbo-Colunga, 2013). Several studies suggest that tolerance of corruption is a 
function of the economic gains voters associate with corrupt politicians, but those studies focus on 
different forms of corruption or economic gains, and they reach divergent conclusions. Some 
experimental studies find support for the idea that citizens are pragmatic with regards to corruption, 
showing that they would tolerate corruption as long as the state of the economy was good (Klasnja & 
Tucker, 2013; Klasnja et al., 2017). Similarly, other studies show that corruption cases that ensure jobs, 
service delivery, or other economic gains are less severely punished than those that do not (Botero, 
Castro Cornejo, Gamboa, Pavão, & Nickerson, 2017; Marko  Klašnja, Lupu, & Tucker, 2017; 
Konstantinidis & Xezonakis, 2013). However, still other studies find no support for the ‘tradeoff 
hypothesis’, showing that voters are unlikely to support a corrupt politician even if this politician 
delivered public goods (Winters & Weitz-Shapiro, 2013), or that competent politicians will in fact pay 
higher costs for corruption than incompetent ones (Esaiasson & Muñoz, 2014). How can we reconcile 
these diverging findings?  
One step toward making sense of the mixed evidence is to consider the channels through 
which economic benefits might motivate voting for corruption. A standard account of the trade-off 
hypothesis attributes tolerance of corruption to differences in corruption types, because certain corruption 
practices may bring side benefits that would render them acceptable. Demanding bribes in exchange 
for public contracts, for example, could be seen as less reprehensible than receiving illegal campaign 
donations from large corporations. The first type of corruption would produce identifiable side 
benefits such as jobs and services, whereas the second type would be obscure about how the average 
voter might benefit from it and would reveal instead a corrupt leader gaining undue political advantage. 
While all types of corruption involve some form of private gain from public office, only some types of 
corruption have evident welfare consequences for the electorate  
(Fernandez-Vazquez et al., 2016).1
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The notion that voters deem some corruption types more acceptable than others is consistent 
with the longstanding idea that voters might reward corruption if they materially benefited from it 
(Rundquist et al., 1977). Several empirical studies have examined the interpretation of the tradeoff 
hypothesis that is based on corruption types. For example, Klasnja et al. (2017) finds that corruption 
that brings construction jobs is punished less harshly than corruption that does not. Botero et al. (2017) 
finds that corrupt behavior described as clientelism would cost candidates less than corrupt behavior 
that is mainly seen as private enrichment.2 Important non-experimental studies also highlight the role 
of welfare consequences of certain corruption types. Fernandez-Vazquez et al. (2016) for instance finds 
that welfare-enhancing types of corruption are less detrimental to electoral success than welfare-
reducing types. That is, citizens see some forms of offenses as less reprehensible when they have the 
potential to improve the material wellbeing of their communities.  
However, another plausible instance of the relationship between economic gains and 
corruption would be one in which voters overlook corruption because the allegedly corrupt politician 
can sometimes be seen as a competent representative as well. By focusing on candidate type rather than 
on corruption type, this second interpretation of the trade-off hypothesis allows us to separate the 
acceptability that certain corruption practices carry from the economic benefit that voters may associate 
with certain types of politicians. This distinction is important, because while corruption might bring 
side benefits, it is still possible that some corrupt mayors were less successful at revitalizing the 
economy than others. Similarly, among candidates who are accused of comparable dishonest behavior, 
some politicians could be more effective in approving advantageous public policies than others. Good 
economic performance, therefore, would indicate that this authority figure is well-suited for the job, 
motivating voters to evaluate corruption qualitatively differently among competent politicians than 
among incompetent ones.  
This subtle difference between two types of channels through which economic benefit shields 
corrupt politicians is particularly relevant in contexts of uninstitutionalized party systems, in which 
partisanship is generally weak and non-programmatic linkages dominate (Kitschelt, 2000; Roberts, 
2013). When voters cannot rely on party or policy cues to make judgments about electoral choices, 
they may find signals of quality in candidates’ revealed attributes. Candidate type becomes a very 
important piece of information to guide voting. In fact, candidate type can be such a strong signal that 
it might motivate voters to overlook corruption evidence. Indicators of candidate competency and 
efficiency would, therefore, assist voters in better evaluating a candidate’s fitness for office and electing 
highly skilled politicians. While acknowledging the importance of previous findings that voters are 
indeed less likely to disapprove of corruption types with side benefits, this paper examines another 
mechanism for the ‘rouba mas faz’ based on candidate type: the role of a candidate’s reputation of being 
an efficient public manager. We should expect to see that citizens punish corruption less harshly in a 
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competent candidate who has shown the ability to deliver collective benefits while in office.  
Studying how candidate traits might influence the way corruption is punished has important 
consequences for the experimental design. Ideally, we would design an experiment that holds the type 
of corruption constant, thereby allowing us to test how candidate competence has a distinct effect on 
citizens' responses to an identical type of corrupt behavior. With a few exceptions (Winters & Weitz-
Shapiro, 2013 and Esaiasson & Muñoz, 2014), the research on the tradeoff hypothesis has mostly 
examined the failure of political accountability as a result of voters’ tolerance of certain corrupt acts. 
Here, I propose to examine it as result of the value voters assign to candidate competence traits. The 
focus on candidate type is important because even if corruption brought side benefits, voters would 
still punish it if corruption came from incompetent politicians.  
The two studies that focus on candidate traits found only partial or null evidence of corruption 
tradeoff, and none of them considered the alternative hypothesis that voters condone corruption 
because of high societal levels of corruption. Winters & Weitz-Shapiro (2013) tested a version of the 
tradeoff, showing the voters prefer corrupt but competent to honest but incompetent. The limitation 
of this test, however, was that it assumed an additive relationship between honesty and competence, 
and did not explicitly test the conditional relationship proposed in this article. In effect, they did not 
evaluate whether corruption effects depend on candidate competence. This paper focuses on this 
nuanced understanding of the tradeoff, in which candidate type induces voters to evaluate corruption 
of competent politicians in a fundamentally different way from that of incompetent ones. Esaiasson & 
Munoz (2014) were able to implement a test for this interaction, but they found no evidence in favor 
of what they called the “dampening” hypothesis. As a result, we do not have strong empirical evidence 
of the conditional relationship between corruption and competency.  
 
Hypothesis 1a: The electoral penalty for corruption is smaller for politicians who are competent than for those 
who are incompetent.  
Another step toward making sense of the mixed evidence in previous work is to consider the 
type of economic gains for which the literature has suggested that voters might reward competent 
authorities. These gains have ranged from competence in promoting local economic development to 
competence in delivering selective goods such as public works or patronage jobs. While subnational 
authorities often claim credit for infrastructure projects that have the potential to directly impact the 
material wellbeing of constituents, public works provision is particularly susceptible to corruption 
(Locatelli, Mariani, Sainati, & Greco, 2017). The public procurement system is often plagued with 
secretive arrangements between public officials and construction contractors. In fact, the central actor 
in one of the largest recent corruption scandals in Latin America is the international giant Odebrecht, 
a construction company that has admitted to paying some $800 million in bribes to public officials 
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across the region. If politicians competent in public works provision were generally perceived as lacking 
integrity, this perception could be one of the reasons why some studies did not find support for an 
explicit exchange of corruption for public works. It is possible that if a community receives outstanding 
public works provision under an authority accused of taking bribes, citizens might take competence as 
a sign of greater opportunities for corruption.3 This discussion yields the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1b: The electoral penalty for corruption is larger for politicians who are competent than for those 
who are incompetent.  
Another explanation for the mixed evidence in favor of the explicit exchange idea would be 
that voters condone corruption in competent politicians in part because they expect corruption to be 
generally widespread among the political elite. In high corruption environments, the comparative 
disadvantage of a corrupt candidate would be underestimated because of the large probability that 
other electoral alternatives would also be corrupt, and because of the prospect that any honest 
candidate would not remain upstanding for a long time (Bauhr & Charron, 2017). Therefore, when 
voters’ prior expectations are that corruption is a normalized practice, new information about one 
official’s honest or dishonest behavior might be overlooked. In other words, we should expect that 
corruption information would not affect voting behavior uniformly across populations with different 
prior beliefs about corruption (Arias, Larreguy, Marshall, & Querubin, 2016).  
Past research has explored the role that voters’ expectations of corruption play in certain 
attitudes towards corruption. Corbacho et al. (2016) find in an experiment embedded in a household 
survey in Costa Rica that citizens are more willing to bribe a police officer when they perceive a high 
level of corruption in society. Similarly, Barr & Serra (2010) find that among undergraduate students 
at Oxford University, the individuals’ propensity to bribe someone was associated with the level of 
corruption in their home countries. While this literature focuses on examining the impact of social 
norms on the likelihood that individuals would engage in corruption, there is less systematic evidence 
regarding how beliefs about societal corruption may affect citizens’ readiness to punish it. Some 
important experimental studies have indirectly focused on individuals’ propensities to punish corrupt 
behavior. In a cross-national study, Marko Klašnja and Tucker (2013) indirectly attribute differences 
in voters’ attitudes toward corrupt but efficient governments to country levels of widespread 
corruption. Also, Cameron et al. (2009) find that greater exposure to corruption in daily life builds 
greater tolerance of corruption.4 Similarly, Pavão (2018) finds that acceptance of corrupt practices 
increases in contexts of high corruption.  
Putting together these studies, the evidence suggests that the environmental degree of 
corruption affects citizens’ electoral reactions to new cases of corruption. Voters would overlook 
corruption accusations when they perceived that the practice of corruption was so widespread that all 
candidates were likely to be corrupt or that throwing one rascal out would do little to reduce the 
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normalization of corruption in society. The present paper, therefore, extends the proposition that prior 
beliefs about societal levels of corruption matter for tolerance of corrupt acts (Pavao, 2018; Cameron 
et al., 2009) and for willingness to engage in corrupt acts (Corbacho et al., 2016), to the study of how 
the pervasiveness of corruption in society influences the individual decision to electorally punish 
corrupt acts of officeholders. This discussion yields the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 2: The electoral penalty for corruption is smaller when a voter expects corruption to be prevalent 
than when a voter expects corruption to be limited.  
 
3. Experimental Design  
This study uses a candidate vignette to randomize the information about not only a 
hypothetical candidate’s corrupt record but also their competence in delivering public works and their 
district’s level of corruption. Similar factorial designs have been used in other survey experiments of 
corruption as a way to test multiple hypotheses by randomly modifying components of a vignette 
(Hainmueller, Hopkins, & Yamamoto, 2013). The vignette was embedded in a nationally representative 
survey in Peru and fielded during a three-week period from November 2nd to November 23rd of 2015 
by a local survey firm, Ipsos-Apoyo.5 A sample of 1,308 Peruvians was randomly drawn using a 
stratified two-stage cluster sampling with replacement. The sample was first stratified into 5 regions: 
Center, North, South, Lima, and Amazon. Then, districts were randomly sampled from within each 
region with replacement, and from each district, neighborhoods were randomly sampled. Face-to-face 
interviews were conducted using electronic devices to record the data.  
The variation of the three experimental factors of interest of two levels each resulted in eight 
vignettes. Respondents were randomly exposed to one of these vignettes and then immediately asked 
to judge the hypothetical politician in the vignette by stating how likely someone like them would cast 
a vote for this candidate. Overall, this experimental approach was adopted as an unobtrusive way to 
measure the socially desirable attitude of rejecting a corrupt candidate.6 First, it does not expose a 
respondent to multiple vignettes that would make them aware of the experimental variations. Second, 
it presents a vignette with a rather complex hypothetical candidate that has multiple qualities, making 
it difficult for the respondent to notice the key factors manipulated in the vignette. And, finally, it asks 
for the attitudes of a third person, allowing the respondent to answer honestly without explicitly stating 
their preference.7 
Holding constant the type of corruption, this vignette varied first whether the hypothetical 
candidate was accused of wrongdoings or not. In the corruption condition, therefore, respondents 
were given information that the fictional politician had been criticized for receiving bribes in exchange 
for public contracts, and in the control condition the hypothetical politician had instead been praised 
for performing these contracts in an honest and transparent manner. The type of corruption was 
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receiving bribes for public contracts, which, unlike illegal campaign funding or private enrichment, can 
potentially have positive economic consequences for the public (e.g. a concession for a large 
infrastructure project could generate jobs and promote economic development). In the competent 
condition, respondents were exposed to a candidate that had enacted more public works than the 
majority of mayors, whereas in the incompetent condition the candidate had completed fewer works 
than the majority of mayors. Notice that all candidates were described as completing some amount of 
public works for the benefit of their communities, but some candidates were outstanding and others 
were mediocre. Finally, in the prevalent corruption condition, the former mayor was running for office 
in a district known for its high levels of corruption, and in the limited corruption condition, this district 
was instead known for its low levels of corruption. 8 
The experimental setting and the wording of the vignette were carefully selected to increase 
success in eliciting honest responses. The Peruvian case helps maximize the chances of properly testing 
the effects of perceptions of widespread corruption as they vary greatly within the country, while 
allowing for realism in the experimentally manipulated contextual conditions. Corruption has become 
one of the most important concerns of Peruvians, but this concern is nevertheless more acute in certain 
regions than in others.9 To ensure the authenticity of the manipulations, which is a major challenge of 
such experiments (Druckman, Green, Kuklinski, & Lupia, 2011), the language of the vignette was 
adapted to Peruvian politics. By presenting a type of corruption that is frequently seen by Peruvians, 
such as taking bribes in exchange for public contracts, I make sure that subjects take the stimulus 
seriously and respond in a meaningful way. Also, by presenting the hypothetical legislative candidate 
as a former mayor, I make sure that the public works provision treatment is realistic. Moreover, to rule 
out the possibility that corruption is overlooked due to lack of credibility of information presented in 
the experimental vignette, I hold the source of the information constant and attribute the accusation 
to an international anticorruption organization, as a way to guard against less trustworthy national 
sources (Botero, Cornejo, Gamboa, Pavao, & Nickerson, 2015; Weitz-Shapiro & Winters, 2017).10  
In terms of comparability, this design most approximates Winters and Weitz-Shapiro (2013)’s 
survey experiment in Brazil, in which they modify candidate competence while holding corruption type 
constant as bribes in exchange for public contracts. Nevertheless, this study differs from their study in 
three important regards. First, this study explicitly tests a non-additive model of corruption voting, in 
which a candidate’s competence trait influences the way voters punish corruption. While their 
experiment focuses on the important question of whether the benefits of a competent administration 
can offset the cost of corruption, this study’s main focus of attention is rather how the influence of 
corruption on vote changes across candidate competence levels. Second, this study disentangles the 
effect of public works provision from that of voters’ expectations of corruption in government by 
manipulating the level of prevalence of corruption in the district where the hypothetical candidate is 
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running for office. Third, the present experiment is different from previous studies of corruption in 
that it investigates accountability for a legislative candidate, a case of accountability that has been 
relatively under-studied in the recent boom of experimental studies of corruption. Having a subnational 
authority switching office instead of retaining the same office serves a way to reduce the over-reporting 
of rejection of a corrupt candidate.11 Seeking reelection is so disreputable in the Peruvian context that 
only 17% of district mayors, 10% of provincial mayors, 16% of governors, and 20% of legislators were 
reelected in the last regional and national elections (Aragón & Incio, 2014). Furthermore, in addition 
to carrying a distinct disadvantage, reelection for subnational authorities in Peru has recently become 
an unrealistic political ambition, as term limits were enacted in 2015.  
 
 
4. Results  
The main outcome of interest is the respondent’s willingness to cast a vote in support of the 
hypothetical candidate. I measured this outcome variable using a 1-7 scale of the likelihood that a 
respondent will opt to vote for the candidate, where 1 is very unlikely and 7 very likely. For ease of the 
analysis, I transform it to a scale of 0-100, where greater numbers represent higher electoral support.  
 
TABLE 1, (THE EFFECT OF CORRUPTION ON ELECTORAL SUPPORT (0-100)) 
 Combined Corrupt Honest ATE P-value 
Support 39.88 30.10 49.74 19.64 0.00 
Stand. Error (0.92) (1.24) (1.25)   
ATE = average treatment effect 
Table 1 lists the mean values of support under the “corrupt” and “honest” conditions, the 
difference in means, and the corresponding standard errors. It shows that when a hypothetical corrupt 
candidate is contrasted with an honest one, support drops from 49.7 to 30.1, and this difference is 
statistically significant (p<0.01). That is, a corrupt record decreases candidate support by 19.6 points 
on the 0-100 scale. To measure the standardized effect size, I divide the average treatment effect of 
corruption (ATE) by the average of the two groups’ standard deviations to reveal that the corruption 
treatment caused a decrease of 0.63 standard deviations. This strong negative effect of corruption 
suggests that when presented with a hypothetical situation, citizens are willing to take notice and reject 
a corrupt official. It confirms the intuition that alleged corrupt behavior has a considerable effect on 
candidate support, a finding that is consistent with the effect of audits found in large-scale field 
experimental studies (Chong et al., 2015; Ferraz & Finan, 2008; Olken, 2007). 
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Do public works help candidates accused of corruption gain electoral support, or do they harm 
their electoral bids even further? In support of hypothesis 1a, I find that voters evaluate corruption of 
competent politicians in a qualitatively different manner from that of incompetent ones. Figure 1 
displays the heterogeneous impact of corruption on electoral support for a hypothetical candidate in 
the two candidate competence conditions. The penalty for corruption is 6.30 (p<0.1) greater for those 
politicians who fail to deliver public works, as the conditional average treatment effect of corruption 
goes from -16.59 (p<0.01) in the competent condition to -22.89 (p<0.01) in the incompetent condition. 
Even though the difference of corruption effects under the high and low competence in public works 
conditions is only significant at the 90% confidence level, this finding provides some evidence in favor 
of the idea that voters would be more lenient toward corrupt politicians who successfully deliver 
tangible benefits to their constituencies.12 
 
FIGURE 1, (SUPPORT BY CORRUPTION AND CANDIDATE COMPETENCE IN PUBLIC WORKS 
PROVISION) 
 
 
 
 
A substantive interpretation of the significant reduction in punishment for corruption suggests 
that voters evaluate corruption with a different mindset when the alleged corrupt candidate is a 
competent politician. This finding runs against hypothesis 1b that public works could increase the 
electoral costs of corruption by signaling greater government involvement in corruption. In contrast 
to the studies in Spain and Sweden (Esaiasson & Munoz, 2014), in which researchers found that 
corruption is more costly for competent politicians than for incompetent ones, competence in public 
works provision mitigates rather than exacerbates the influence of corruption on vote in this Peruvian 
sample.  
Turning our attention to the second hypothesis, are citizens more lenient with an official’s 
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wrongdoing when corruption is normalized? To explore the ‘they are all corrupt’ hypothesis that 
corruption is penalized less when it is considered a widespread phenomenon, I examine whether the 
corruption effect is conditional on the level of corruption prevalence. Against hypothesis 2, I do not 
find evidence of this relationship. Figure 2 shows that the electoral punishment is slightly smaller, 
though not statistically significant, for corrupt candidates under the high prevalence of corruption 
treatment condition (-18.98 with p-value<0.01) than under the low prevalence of corruption condition 
(-20.35 with p-value<0.01). Although electoral penalties are on average 1.37 points lower for candidates 
who run in a low corruption environment than they are for candidates in a high corruption 
environment, I cannot reject the possibility that this difference is not statistically different from zero. 
This finding suggests that, although voters do not overlook corruption when corruption is widespread, 
they do not apply a corruption penalty of a different magnitude in a context of low prevalence of 
corruption.  
FIGURE 2, (ELECTORAL SUPPORT BY CORRUPTION PREVALENCE AND CORRUPTION) 
 
 
 
To better understand this null result, I explore whether it is possible that the perception of 
corruption as a widespread phenomenon motivates voters to penalize all candidates, be they corrupt 
or honest. Would voters take cues from the environment and hold all leaders accountable for 
corruption observed in society, including an honest candidate who was not accused of any 
wrongdoing? As expected, we find that upstanding candidates suffer when corruption is widespread. 
In Table 2, the significant average treatment effect of widespread corruption suggests that all candidates 
are negatively affected when corruption is perceived to be high, and the conditional average treatment 
effects indicate that the honest candidates are particularly disfavored by perceptions of widespread 
corruption. This observation is in line with what Chong et al. (2015) found in Mexico about how 
corruption information decreased not only incumbent party support but also challenger party support 
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and voter turnout. It also speaks to a broader literature on the demobilizing effects of corruption 
(Bowler and Karp, 2004; Chang and Chu 2005; Carreras and Vera 2018, Kostadinova, 2009; Seligson 
2002; Sundström & Stockemer, 2015).  
 
TABLE 2, (THE EFFECT OF WIDESPREAD CORRUPTION ON ELECTORAL SUPPORT (0-100)) 
 Combined Honest Corrupt 
Limited Corruption 41.73 52.02 31.67 
 (1.32) 0.09 0.10 
Prevalent Corruption 38.04 47.5 28.51 
 (1.28) (1.83) (1.75) 
Difference -3.70** -4.52* -2.47 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < .10, ∗∗p < .05, *** p< .001 
 
I have presented evidence in favor of hypothesis 1a suggesting that the cost of corruption is 
mitigated by the competence of a candidate in delivering public works, but it is possible that the 
tradeoff effect is only present in highly corrupt environments. If the candidate were instead running in 
a context where corruption is rare, then the shielding effect of competence in delivering economic 
benefits might turn ineffective. To uncover where the trading effect comes from, I calculate the 
conditional effect of corruption on candidate competence at different levels of corruption prevalence. 
Contrary to our expectation, the trading is not present in the high prevalence of corruption group. 
Table 3 shows the coefficient estimates of electoral support for the respondents in the subgroups of 
high and low prevalence separately. While competence does mitigate the effect of corruption in the 
full sample, it does not seem to matter in this way for the subsample of respondents in the high 
prevalence of corruption treatment. Hence, perceptions of widespread corruption do not appear to be 
driving the competence-corruption trading strategy.  
 
TABLE 3, (TRADING BY PREVALENCE OF CORRUPTION) 
Variables  Full Sample Sub Sample 
 Combined 
Prevalent 
Corruption 
Limited 
Corruption 
Prevalent 
Corruption  
Limited Corruption  
Corruption -22.89*** -21.84*** -23.95*** -19.49*** -23.46*** 
 [2.46] [3.56] [3.40] [5.50] [4.10] 
Competence 7.05** 7.12** 7.10** 14.45** 11.16** 
 [2.46] [3.54] [3.43] [5.56] [4.15] 
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Corruption * Competence 6.30* 5.59 6.91 3.40 3.65 
 [3.48] [5.01] [4.82] [7.96] [5.95] 
Intercept 46.23*** 43.92*** 48.53*** 42.77*** 46.61*** 
 [1.74] [2.51] [2.40] [4.05] [2.83] 
N 1271 638 633 223 430 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < .10, ∗∗p < .05, *** p< .001 
 
Finally, to take into account the possibility that our contextual corruption treatment was 
unsuccessful, in an additional analysis I excluded the cases of a mismatch between the treatment and 
underlying levels of institutional trust. That is, I restricted the analysis to only the most likely cases for 
a successful manipulation. For the limited treatment condition, I considered only those respondents 
living in a region of high trust in institutions, and for the prevalence of corruption condition, I included 
just the cases of low trust in institutions.13 While this decision might interfere with the randomization, 
the new indicator of widespread corruption is not fully correlated with other contextual variables in 
the same way as an entirely observational indicator would. As expected, the conclusions are similar 
using both a full sample and a restricted sample of most likely cases; the mitigating effect of competence 
is not limited to highly corrupt environments.  
 
5. Discussion  
In this paper, I considered different ways the political context in which information is 
disseminated matters for political accountability for corruption. I identified and tested one particular 
form of tradeoff between corruption and economic performance that distinctly embodies the puzzle 
of voters condoning corrupt politicians: precisely how would candidate competence in public works 
provision influence electoral support for a corrupt politician? I found that the magnitude of the effect 
of corruption is conditional upon the candidate’s perceived ability to provide public works, but not in 
the same direction that prior studies of corruption and public works provision have found (Esaiasson 
& Muñoz, 2014). In this Peruvian sample, rather than exacerbating the costs of corruption, public 
works provision mitigates the negative effects of corruption on vote. This outcome is in line with what 
the ‘rouba mas faz’ literature suggests about the exchange of economic gains for corruption, yet it 
remains contrary to what the empirical literature examining public works provision had found so far.  
Adding further nuance to the discussion, this finding indicates that punishment for corruption 
is not necessarily negated by candidate competence, but that citizens apply a smaller penalty for 
corruption if a politician has the reputation of an efficient public manager. Therefore, instead of a 
classical tradeoff relationship where voters prefer a corrupt but competent candidate to an honest but 
incompetent one (Winters & Weitz-Shapiro, 2013), the evidence suggests that voters evaluate 
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corruption of competent politicians in a qualitatively different manner from that of incompetent ones. 
Far from being fully acceptant of corruption, therefore, voters resist it quietly by taking cues from 
competence traits to decide when and how to penalize a corrupt leader.  
This study also relates to a central debate on the role of social norms in the persistence of 
corruption. Building upon existing evidence, I argued that when voters expect corrupt behavior to be 
the norm among the political elite, they do not update candidate evaluations after a single accusation 
of corruption as they might if corruption were atypical. 14  Such a saturation effect is particularly 
concerning in the face of the increasing efficacy of oversight institutions and news media in scrutinizing 
and publicizing corruption around the world. Against expectations, however, I found that Peruvians 
do not overlook corruption when they view it as inevitable; they instead punish corrupt incumbents 
just as severely in both high and low corruption environments. This trend is in part due to the fact that 
voters blame all candidates for a highly corrupt environment, and this responsibility might especially 
hurt the honest candidates, setting an already low reference point.  
Further exploring the role of the context of widespread corruption in electoral accountability 
for corruption, I found that the competence-corruption trading strategy is not particular only to highly 
corrupt environments. This finding runs against cross-national studies suggesting that voters condone 
corruption in candidates who create positive economic conditions in highly corrupt countries but do 
not overlook it in less corrupt countries (Klasknja and Tucker, 2013). Testing this conditionality directly 
by randomizing corruption levels across different candidate types, I found no effect. Furthermore, the 
replication of this null finding with a subsample of most likely cases suggests that it cannot be fully 
explained by a possibly unsuccessful treatment. Nevertheless, future studies should try other innovative 
methods to test directly how voters’ expectations matter in political accountability for corruption.    
Overall, these results suggest that voters apply differential penalties to corruption depending 
on candidate reputation of public works provision. Nevertheless, this finding should be taken with 
caution. Before over-extrapolating from a single experiment, other studies could explore in greater 
depth the nuances of corruption voting in highly corrupt environments. One interesting avenue for 
future research would be to compare these survey experimental results to a behavioral benchmark. 
Whereas some argue that survey experiments would underestimate corruption effects in comparison 
to field experimental measures using secret ballots (Boas, Hidalgo, & Melo, 2017), others have found 
that stated preferences in survey experiments match behavioral benchmarks rather well (Hainmueller, 
Hangartner, & Yamamoto, 2015).  
Note also that I do not mean to say that corruption effects will always be mitigated by public 
works provision. First, it is possible that if electoral campaigns were more party-centered, the personal 
reputation of a candidate who ‘gets things done’ might not serve as a shield against corruption 
accusations. In real-world elections, policy issues might become more salient, especially in party-
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centered elections, and other factors such as media or campaign strategies could also play an important 
role. Second, the effect of public works provision might be particularly strong in Peru where both 
subnational authorities as well as national representatives are expected to provide public works to their 
constituencies, directly or indirectly. Nevertheless, I anticipate these results to be relevant for any 
developing country where political representatives are seen as agents of constituents’ demands vis-à-
vis the central government.  
Finally, the results of this study have implications for the challenges highly corrupt countries 
face in breaking the vicious cycle of corruption (Ashworth, Bueno de Mesquita, & Friedenberg, 2013). 
While it is generally thought that social norms reinforce the persistence of corruption, these results 
suggest that when voters are exposed to credible information about corrupt behavior, even in the case 
of competent candidates, they will punish corruption. This implication calls into question the 
conventional image of citizens’ high tolerance of corruption, and it points to the need for additional 
research that develops and tests theories that will elucidate the circumstances in which disseminated 
corruption information can affect political accountability for exposed corruption. More studies about 
corruption are urgently needed in contemporary Latin America, where abundant information about 
government officials’ malfeasance inundates the news, and where growing awareness appears to be 
turning cynicism into resistance.  Finally, while electoral accountability is only one of the many 
mechanisms that can help prevent corruption in government, the changing citizen attitudes toward 
corruption can play a central role in the development of new and more effective institutional checks 
on corruption.  
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APPENDIX 
TABLE A1, (SUMMARY STATISTICS) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Education Level 2.71 1.40 0 7 
Age (18-70) 37.69 14.06 18 70 
Female (0-1) 0.50 0.50 0 1 
Socioeconomic Level (1-5) 3.22 1.03 1 5 
 
TABLE A2, (BALANCE TESTS) 
 
Variable Combined Corrupt Honest P-value 
 N=1308 N=652 N=656  
Age (18-65) 37.69 38.06 37.32 0.34 
Female (0-1) 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.87 
Education (0-7) 2.71 2.69 2.72 0.74 
Socioeconomic (1-5) 3.22 3.23 3.21 0.83 
 
FIGURE A1, (VIGNETTE) 
 
 
“Imagine that Juan is a candidate for congress in a region known for its [high/low] levels of corruption. An 
international anticorruption commission has [criticized/praised] Juan for performing multiple public contracts in 
[exchange for bribes amounting to 1 million soles/ an honest and transparent manner] during his previous 
administration as mayor. Also, Juan is known because he enacted [more/fewer] works benefiting the population 
than the majority of the mayors in the country. Juan asserts that if he is elected congress member he will work to 
improve the quality of life in his region" 
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TABLE A3, (CORRUPTION EFFECT ON ELECTORAL SUPPORT) 
DV: Support (0–100) 
Model 
(1) 
Model 
(2) 
Model 
(3) 
Model 
(4) 
Model 
(5) 
Model 
(6) 
Corruption -19.76*** -23.62*** -23.50*** -23.50*** -23.42*** -23.50*** 
 [1.74] [3.01] [3.00] [2.69] [2.97] [2.98] 
Competence 10.24*** 7.11** 7.13** 7.13** 6.98** 7.13** 
 [1.74] [2.46] [2.45] [3.11] [2.43] [2.44] 
Prevalence -3.89** -4.60* -4.70* -4.70** -4.78** -4.70** 
 [1.74] [2.46] [2.45] [2.26] [2.44] [2.44] 
Corruption * Competence  6.25* 6.57* 6.57* 7.19** 6.57** 
  [3.48] [3.45] [3.82] [3.43] [3.44] 
Corruption * Prevalence  1.45 1.43 1.43 1.41 1.43 
  [3.48] [3.46] [2.93] [3.44] [3.45] 
Constant 46.61*** 48.53*** 51.92*** 51.92*** 53.09*** 51.92*** 
 [1.74] [2.13] [6.61] [7.30] [6.63] [6.58] 
Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1270 1270 1270 1270 1270 1270 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets ∗p < .10, ∗∗p < .05, *** p< .001. Models 1-3 are standard linear regressions. Model 4 uses survey 
sampling weights and clustering. Model 5 is a multilevel regression with random effects specified at the district level. Model 6 is a multilevel 
mixed-effects generalized linear model for survey data. Controls in models 3-6 are gender, age, education, and socioeconomic level. 
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1 On a similar note Bauhr (2017) points out that the differences between need and greed corruption can have important 
consequences for citizens’ mobilization in the fight against corruption. 
2 In an experiment investigating vote buying, Weschle (2016) reaches a related conclusion, that voters judge politicians 
who engage in corruption differently depending on how they use the money they receive. 
3 This idea could be in line with the popular saying ‘el que no transa no avanza’ (‘he who does not cheat does not get 
ahead’), according to which the only conceivable way of conducting political affairs is by making deals with privates 
seeking to obtain special treatment by illegal means. Hence, a politician with a reputation of being an efficient public 
manager might be suspected of corruption, even if no direct accusation against him was aired.  
4 Based on experiments conducted in four countries, they find a substantial cross-country variation in retribution for norm 
violators, leading them to report that people may be less willing to punish corruption when they see it in others. 
5 This survey was entrusted by a nonprofit organization, Proética, the Peruvian Chapter of Transparency International, 
which has run a survey every year since 2004. Results of all the annual corruption surveys can be found at: 
http://www.proetica.org.pe/encuestas-corrupcion/ 
6 Although I did not expect a strong social norm in favor of punishing corruption in Peru, a country that is plagued by weak 
rule of law, I opted for a methodology that would guard us against any social desirability bias as much as possible. 
7 We take advantage of the third-person question wording to prevent the over-reporting of disapproval of a candidate 
described as corrupt in the vignette. Even though the wording of the question could introduce some noise in the 
responses, it diminishes the bias generated by social desirability. 
8 Note that I opted to manipulate the characteristics of the region described in the vignette, because a subject’s 
perceptions about a hypothetical political scenario are easier to modify than their views about the environment they 
actually live in.  
9 In some regions, the percent of respondents who think corruption is one of the three most important problems in the 
country reaches as high as 50%, but in others, corruption is considered one of the three most important problems only for 
25% of respondents (according to 2015 Peruvian National Household Survey). The massive ongoing scandal surrounding 
Brazil’s construction company Odebrecht, which triggered the crisis leading to the resignation of President Pedro Pablo 
Kuczynski on March 2018, emerged after our survey work was completed. 
10 Following the definition by Weitz-Shapiro and Winters (2014), credible information is data produced by a source that 
does not have an incentive to lie about the information it disseminates.  
11 Recent studies of incumbency in developing countries have found that incumbents are less likely to win than 
challengers (Marko  Klašnja et al., 2017; Marko Klašnja & Titiunik, 2017; Roh, 2017; Uppal, 2009). 
12 As an additional identification method, I also use a series of regressions to simultaneously add interaction effects 
between vignette factors and take into account the clustered structure of the data. Table A3 in Appendix reports the 
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coefficient estimates, which show that the negative effect of corruption remains statistically significant across different 
model specifications, and that the interaction effect also appears significant, confirming the intuition that competence 
moderates the effect of corruption on electoral support.  
13 Low and high trusting regions are coded with data from the 2014 National Household Survey (ENAHO). 
14 One study of accountability in Mali have placed a similar emphasis on the role of citizens’ expectations (Gottlieb, 2016). 
When citizens underestimate government, they hold politicians to a lower standard and sanction poor performers less 
often. 
